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This contribution aims to analyse and assess the draft agreement on the
European Union’s (EU) accession to the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR).1 The draft agreement was drawn up by a so-called ‘informal
working group’ situated within the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee on
Human Rights (CDDH). The group consisted of fourteen experts, seven from
EU Member States and seven from non-EU countries, who had been chosen on
the basis of their experience and not as representatives of their governments. The
meetings were held with representatives of the European Commission, which
had been issued with a negotiating mandate by the Council of the EU,2 and
were attended by experts from the Council of Europe.3 Negotiations started in
July 2010 and a draft agreement was presented on 24 June 2011, which was
endorsed by the CDDH on 14 October 2011. Currently, negotiations are on-
going within the European Union, with notably the United Kingdom
and France advocating amendments to the draft agreement, which will be
referred to where relevant to this contribution.4 However, the core features of
the draft agreement, which are the subject of this article, do not seem to be in
doubt.
Over thirty years after the European Commission first mooted an accession
by the EU to the ECHR and almost twenty years after the ECJ rendered
Opinion 2/94, which clarified that accession would be impossible without an
explicit competence in the Treaties, this draft agreement might mean the end to
a discussion of almost epic proportions.5 But even if the draft agreement is
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1 CDDH(2011)009.
2 Council Resolution authorising the Commission to negotiate the Accession Agreement of the
European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (ECHR), doc no 9689/10 (11 May 2010), which is partly classified.
3 CDDH, ad hoc terms of reference, CDDH(2010)008.
4 Should the EU agree to propose changes, these would then have to be negotiated with the
Council of Europe, cf Council of the EU, doc no 18117/11, para 8.
5 Pre-Lisbon publications include: H Golsong, ‘Grundrechtsschutz im Rahmen der Europa¨ischen
Gemeinschaften’ [1978] Europa¨ische Grundrechtezeitschrift 346; European Commission,
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endorsed by the European Union and the Council of Europe, its ratification
may take some time.6 The EU’s internal ratification process requires unanimity
in the Council, the consent of the European Parliament, and separate approval
by the Member States according to their constitutional traditions.7 Moreover,
the draft accession agreement does not provide rules on how ECHR member-
ship is dealt with by the EU internally. Internal rules, eg on the details of the
prior involvement of the ECJ, will also have to be drawn up and agreed upon by
all EU Member States.8 In addition, all parties to the ECHR must ratify the
agreement. Given the lengthy ratification process for Protocol No 14, accession
may not happen as swiftly as some may hope for.9
As a background to the following discussion, it is necessary to briefly address
the situation pre-accession. While the EU cannot be held directly responsible
before it,10 the Strasbourg Court has developed a sophisticated set of case-law on
the indirect responsibility of the EU, which is accomplished by holding its
Member States responsible instead. One can distinguish three scenarios,
which are of relevance to this paper. According to the Matthews decision, the
EU’s Member States are responsible for violations of the Convention found in
the EU’s primary law, ie mainly the Treaties.11 The reasoning in Matthews was
‘Memorandum on the accession of the Communities to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ Bull EC Supp 2/79; M Ruffert, ‘Anmerkung zu
Gutachten 2/94’ [1996] Juristenzeitung 624; S Winkler, Der Beitritt der Europa¨ischen Gemeinschaften
zur Europa¨ischen Menschenrechtskonvention, (Nomos: Baden-Baden, 2000); B Moriarty, ‘EC
Accession to the ECHR’ [2001] Hibernian Law Journal 13; K Strasser, Grundrechtsschutz in
Europa und der Beitritt der Europa¨ischen Gemeinschaften zur Europa¨ischen
Menschenrechtskonvention (Peter Lang: Frankfurt, 2001); W Schaller, ‘Das Verha¨ltnis von EMRK
und deutscher Rechtsordnung vor und nach dem Beitritt der EU zur EMRK’ [2006] Europarecht
656; more recent publications include: V Skouris, ‘First Thoughts on the Forthcoming Accession of
the European Union to the European Convention of Human Rights’ in D Spielmann, M Tsirli, and
P Voyatzis (eds), The European Convention on Human Rights, a Living Instrument (Bruylant: Brussels,
2011), 555; N O’Meara, ‘A More Secure Europe of Rights? The European Court of Human Rights,
the Court of Justice of the European Union and EU Accession to the ECHR’ (2011) 12 German Law
Journal 1813; P Gragl, ‘Der rechtliche Status der EMRK innerhalb des Unionsrechts. Zu den
Auswirkungen auf die Rechtsautonomie der Europa¨ischen Union nach ihrem Beitritt zur EMRK’
(2011) 14 Zeitschrift fu¨r Europarechtliche Studien 409; JP Jacque´, ‘The Accession of the European
Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms’ (2011) 48
CMLRev 995.
6 In addition, a new Opinion by the ECJ is likely.
7 Article 218(6) and (8) TFEU; it is important to note that the United Kingdom’s approval to the
accession Treaty will not be subjected to a so-called ‘referendum lock’ under the European Union
Bill. Section 10 of the Bill makes it clear that the government may give its approval to the accession
agreement under Art 218(8) TFEU once the agreement has passed through Parliament.
8 A classified set of draft rules have been prepared for adoption by the Council, Council of the EU
doc no 10744/12.
9 On the other hand, Kuijer has suggested that Russia, which had long blocked Protocol No 14,
would be pleased to see that the EU is finally joining the Convention, cf M Kuijer, ‘The Accession of
the European Union to the ECHR’ Amsterdam Law Forum, Vol 3, No 4 <http://www.amsterdam
lawforum.org> accessed 13 December 2011.
10 Confe´de´ration franc¸aise du travail v European Communities, no 8030/77, 13 DR 236.
11 Matthews v United Kingdom [GC], no 24833/94, ECHR 1999-I.
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based on the notion that while the Convention allowed the Member States to
transfer sovereign power onto an international organization, violations of the
Convention by that organization would be attributable to them. The Member
States were thus deemed unable to escape their obligations under the
Convention. This reasoning was employed again in the Bosphorus case where
the compatibility of secondary EU law (a Council Regulation) was at issue.12 In
Bosphorus, the Court distinguished between acts of secondary law which give
discretion to Member States in their implementation and those which do not.
For the latter, the Court introduced a presumption that acts are compatible with
the Convention unless there was a ‘manifest deficit’ in the protection of
Convention rights in the concrete case. In all other cases, the Member States
are fully responsible.13 The final scenario of relevance here is a situation where
there is no Member State involvement but only action by the EU. In the case of
Connolly, it became evident that in such cases there is a gap in the protection by
the Strasbourg Court.14 The Court considered that the alleged infringement was
not attributable to the respondent Member State since it did not happen within
its jurisdiction as is required by Article 1 ECHR. The EU’s accession to the
ECHR will close this gap in the external supervision by the ECtHR since after
accession the EU will be directly responsible in such cases.
The following pages first discuss the effects which accession will have on the
system of human rights protection under the ECHR focusing on the most
relevant features of the accession agreement, such as the co-respondent mech-
anism and the prior involvement of the ECJ. The second part of this contribu-
tion explores the future status of the ECHR in the EU’s legal order.
I. The EU as a Party to the ECHR: Changes to the ECHR System
The accession agreement focuses exclusively on the ECHR system of human
rights protection and does not directly deal with European Union law.15 The
agreement foresees some amendments to the ECHR itself, but the details of the
EU’s involvement in the ECHR will be regulated by the accession agreement to
which the (amended) ECHR will make explicit reference.16 The most important
changes concern the procedure before the European Court of Human Rights
(ECtHR) in cases involving the EU. The rules of the accession agreement are
drafted in a very general and open-ended manner. It seems that this was done
deliberately in light of the difficulties faced by the negotiators. They had to
12 Bosphorus v Ireland [GC], no 45036/98, ECHR 2005-VI.
13 See for instance M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece [GC], no 30696/09, 21 January 2011.
14 Connolly v 15 Member States of the European Union, no 73274/01, 9 December 2008.
15 Otherwise the agreement might violate the autonomy of EU law, cf T Lock, ‘Walking on a
Tightrope’ (2011) 48 CMLRev 1025, 1028 et seq.
16 cf Art 1(2) accession agreement, amending Art 59(2) ECHR, CDDH-UE(2011)16.
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strike a balance between their aim of accomplishing accession and the con-
straints of European Union law, and in particular the ECJ’s strict case-law on
the conferral of jurisdiction on international courts, a stance which it recently
reaffirmed in Opinion 1/09 on the European Patents Court.17 The negotiators
therefore opted for relatively general rules in the draft accession agreement
which would be supplemented by rules internal to the European Union. At
the time of writing the latter have not yet been publicized.18
A. The Co-respondent Mechanism
The European Union will be an unusual party to the ECHR. The reason is that
where EU law is at stake, there is often a separation between the law-making
entity (the EU) and the executing entity (the Member State). While this is not
unusual in a federal setting, with which the EU can be compared, it is unheard
of that both federation (EU) and constituent States (Member States) are parties
to the ECHR. Since most EU legislation is implemented by the Member States
and since the EU only rarely acts vis-a`-vis individuals, an applicant would usu-
ally find it difficult to ascertain who was responsible for the infringement of his
human rights: the EU or the Member State, the authorities of which were in
contact with the individual. In such a situation, an applicant has the option to
hold one of them alone responsible or both together. In either scenario a further
complication arises in that a respondent might raise the defence that it was not
responsible for the violation, eg because it (a Member State) only followed its
strict obligations under EU law.19 If this were possible, the ECtHR would be
forced to engage in an interpretation of the EU Treaties and possibly of the
division of competence between the EU and the Member States, which would
be incompatible with the autonomy of the EU’s legal order. That autonomy
requires that the procedures for resolving disputes will not have the effect of
binding the EU and its institutions to a particular interpretation of the rules of
EU law.20 The EU would therefore be unable to agree to such a model.21 This is
why Article 1 of Protocol No 8 to the Lisbon Treaty stipulates that the accession
agreement must make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the
Union and Union law, especially by ensuring that individual applications
are correctly addressed to the EU and/or the Member States as appropriate.22
17 Opinion 1/09 European and Community Patents Court [2011] ECR I-00000.
18 A classified draft exists, however, cf Council Document 10744/12.
19 Such situations have been explicitly recognized by the ECtHR in the Bosphorus presumption,
which in practice has the same effect as a defence.
20 Opinion 1/00 [2002] ECR I-3493, para 13.
21 cf Lock, n 15.
22 Protocol No 8 to the Lisbon Treaty [2010] OJ C 83/273.
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For this reason the drafters developed the so-called co-respondent mechanism.23
Further considerations guiding its adoption were to ensure the accountability for
violations of the ECHR, the enforceability of judgments against the party which
is capable of removing the violation, and to allow that party to fully participate
in the proceedings before the ECtHR.24 Thus the mechanism is deemed to serve
the proper administration of justice. The draft agreement provides that Article
36 ECHR should be amended as follows:
The European Union or a member State of the European Union may become a
co-respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the circumstances set out
in the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A
co-respondent is a party to the case. The admissibility of an application shall be
assessed without regard to the participation of a co-respondent in the proceedings.
The accession agreement itself contains further details in Article 3:25
2. Where an application is directed against one or more member States of the
European Union, the European Union may become a co-respondent to the
proceedings in respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it
appears that such allegation calls into question the compatibility with the
Convention rights at issue of a provision of European Union law, notably
where that violation could have been avoided only by disregarding an obli-
gation under European Union law.
3. Where an application is directed against the European Union, the
European Union member States may become co-respondents to the proceed-
ings in respect of an alleged violation notified by the Court if it appears that
such allegation calls into question the compatibility with the Convention
rights at issue of a provision of the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty
on the Functioning of the European Union or any other provision having the
same legal value pursuant to those instruments, notably where that violation
could have been avoided only by disregarding an obligation under those
instruments.
4. Where an application is directed against and notified to both the European
Union and one or more of its member States the status of any respondent may
be changed to that of a co-respondent, if the conditions in paragraph 2 or
paragraph 3 are met.
23 It is based on a proposal contained in a 2002 study by the CDDH on the technical and legal
issues of a possible EC/EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights,
CDDH(2002)010 Addendum 2.
24 CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 33.
25 The United Kingdom proposed to return to an earlier, narrower draft of the co-respondent
mechanism, which was not supported by other delegations in the Council of Ministers, cf Council of
the EU, doc no 16385/11.
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5. A High Contracting Party shall become a co-respondent only at its own
request and by decision of the Court. The Court shall seek the views of all
parties to the proceedings. When deciding on such request the Court shall
assess whether, in the light of the reasons given by the High Contracting Party
concerned, it is plausible that the conditions in paragraph 2 or paragraph 3 are
met.
(i) General Remarks on the Involvement of the Co-respondent
In line with its rationale explored above, the co-respondent mechanism will be
limited to the EU context.26 In order to appreciate the unique position of the
co-respondent it is necessary to point out the differences to a third-party inter-
vention and to multiple respondents. In contrast to a third party intervening in
proceedings under Article 36 (1) and (2) ECHR, the co-respondent becomes a
party to the proceedings and is consequently bound by the Court’s judgment.27
In a similar vein, both respondent and co-respondent must agree to a friendly
settlement or to make unilateral declarations. In that sense the leeway for both
respondent and co-respondent is restricted.
A party can also become co-respondent where a case was directed against both
the EU and one or more Member States as multiple respondents from the
outset. This provision deserves explanation since it is not obvious why it is
needed. Where a case is directed against multiple respondents, the case is treated
like a bundle of applications each of which is directed against one respondent.
They are merely joined together. As a consequence, each application needs to
fulfil the admissibility criteria laid down in Articles 34 and 35 ECHR, the most
important of which is the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies. In con-
trast, where one of the parties is co-respondent, there is no need for the appli-
cant to exhaust the remedies in the co-respondent’s legal order since the
admissibility of a case is assessed without regard to the participation of a
co-respondent.
The decision whether a party will be allowed to join proceedings as
co-respondent, ie whether its status will be changed to that effect, lies with
the ECtHR on the request of the party. The Court has no discretion in the
matter. Most notably, it cannot force the EU or a Member State to become
co-respondent as the status of co-respondent is voluntary.28 The explanatory
report suggests that the question of co-respondent will only become relevant
26 Where other non-Member States apply EU law because of separate agreements (eg the Schengen
agreement), the EU can only be involved via the third-party intervention, cf CDDH-UE(2011)16,
para 40.
27 The explanatory report makes it clear that there is still room for the EU to intervene in
proceedings where the co-respondent mechanism is not applicable, CDDH-UE(2011)16, paras
39–40.
28 An appraisal of the voluntary character of the mechanism can be found below.
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where an individual application was communicated to the respondent.29
Communication only happens where an application is not clearly inadmis-
sible,30 which would include many manifestly ill-founded applications. Thus
the question of whether a co-respondent should be joined will only be relevant
in few cases. Furthermore, the admissibility of the application will be assessed
without regard to the participation of the co-respondent, ie as if the case were
only brought against the respondent. Thus the earliest a party may make a
request to become co-respondent is after the case has been communicated to
the original respondent. But the draft agreement does not address the question
of the latest possibility for the co-respondent to join proceedings. Since one of
the purposes of the co-respondent mechanism is to allow full participation of
the co-respondent in proceedings, it would seem appropriate that there should
be a time limit for the co-respondent to join. It is common for the Court to give
the parties a final opportunity to make submissions. Since all submissions after
that are considered as unsolicited and will not normally be admitted to the
file,31 a co-respondent should not be allowed to make submissions after this
point in time. It follows that at this stage it should no longer be allowed to join
either.
A related question would be whether in case of a referral to the Grand
Chamber under Article 43 ECHR a potential co-respondent would be able to
join proceedings after the referral has taken place. The Grand Chamber is not
limited in its examination of the case to grounds of appeal or to the submissions
of the party requesting the referral. Rather it ‘may employ the full range of
judicial powers conferred on the Court’.32 Since the Grand Chamber allows new
pleadings, there is no argument why a co-respondent should not be invited to
join the proceedings. Procedurally, the applicant would not be in a worse
position.
The draft agreement and the explanatory report are also silent concerning
interim measures, which the Court may designate under Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court. Since such interim measures can only be binding on the parties to the
dispute, they would obviously not bind a (potential) co-respondent before join-
ing the case. However, once a co-respondent has been admitted to proceedings,
it would become necessary that the Court extends the measures to the
co-respondent. As the Court can act of its own motion, this should not cause
any problems.
The consequence of a judgment finding a violation would be that the EU and
the Member State(s) would be jointly responsible.33 The United Kingdom
29 CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 45.
30 D Harris, M O’Boyle, C Warbrick, and E Bates (eds), Law of the European Convention on Human
Rights (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2009), 825.
31 Ibid at 825.
32 Pisano v Italy [GC], no 36732/97, 24 October 2002.
33 CDDH(2011)009, para 54.
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proposed that the ECtHR should be allowed to give judgment against an indi-
vidual respondent or co-respondent only where the parties jointly notify the
Court that such a differentiated judgment is appropriate.34 This seems to have
been accepted by most other Member States in discussions within the Council
of Ministers.35 However, this proposal should be viewed critically. It would be
highly problematic to give the ECtHR competence to decide on the internal
division of responsibility between the EU and its Member States since such
decisions are reserved to the ECJ.36 Furthermore, it is problematic from a pro-
cedural point of view if such a decision is made without the approval of the
applicant. After all, once a party has agreed to become co-respondent, there
should not be a possibility for either respondent or co-respondent to escape their
responsibility. It would be better if an internal mechanism for resolving ques-
tions of ultimate responsibility, ie of who should have to pay a possible ‘just
compensation’ awarded by the ECtHR, were created.
The following critical appraisal is preceded by a brief description of the
mechanics of the mechanism, which addresses both cases in which the EU
becomes co-respondent and cases in which a Member State becomes
co-respondent.
(ii) The EU as Co-respondent
Where an application is initially directed against a Member State, the EU may
become co-respondent where a provision of EU law might be in violation of
Convention rights.
The substantive test to be carried out by the ECtHR asks it to assess whether
the applicant’s allegations call into question the compatibility of a provision of
EU law with the Convention. The wording of that provision as well as the
explanatory report to the draft agreement suggest that ‘a provision’ of EU law
can mean a provision of either primary or secondary law. This is remarkable
given one of the rationales for the co-respondent mechanism is to account for
the situation in which acts of the Union’s institutions are implemented by the
Member States.37 Since only the EU can remove a violation found in its own
secondary law, extending the binding reach of the judgment is apposite. With
regard to primary law implemented by the Member States, however, that ra-
tionale does not seem to apply since primary law is agreed upon by the Member
States as well. It is not clear from the drafting history whether obligations arising
from primary law were included deliberately or whether they ‘slipped in’. The
very first draft referred to ‘legal acts or measures of the European Union’.38 This
34 UK non-paper on the draft agreement, Council of the EU doc no 1563/11, which proposes the
inclusion of Art 3(7) providing for such a possibility.
35 Council of the EU, doc no 16385/11, p 5.
36 cf Opinion 1/91, [1991] ECR I-6079, paras 34–35; Lock, n 15, 1043.
37 CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 32.
38 CDDH-UE(2011)04.
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formulation was narrower and seemed restricted to secondary legislation and
other measures by the EU’s institutions. The next draft included the reference to
‘European Union law’ as one can find it in the final draft agreement.39 There is
no reference in the explanatory report why this change was made. This is
regrettable for an explanation would have improved our understanding of the
mechanism.
But there is further room for criticism. The unambiguous requirement that
the applicant’s allegation calls into question the compatibility of a provision of
EU law with the Convention is unfortunately obfuscated by the subordinate
clause following it, which states that this would notably be the case where the
violation could only be avoided by disregarding an obligation under EU law.
The adverb ‘notably’ would suggest that ‘disregarding an obligation under EU
law’ constitutes a sub-category of the general requirement ‘compatibility of a
provision of EU law with the Convention’. By referring to ‘an obligation’ the
draft does not make it sufficiently clear whether this obligation is an obligation
contained in the allegedly incompatible provision of EU law or whether it can
be any obligation under EU law. A comparison with Article 3(3) of the draft
agreement shows that the provision could have been drafted much clearer with
Article 3(3) stipulating that ‘a violation could only have been avoided by dis-
regarding an obligation under those instruments [emphasis added]’. It is sug-
gested that Article 3(2) should be understood in the same manner, ie that the
co-respondent mechanism should apply notably where the violation could only
be avoided by disregarding an obligation under that provision.
For the Court, the test to be carried out is only cursory. It merely needs to be
satisfied that it is plausible that it ‘appears’ that the applicant’s allegations call
into question the compatibility of a provision of EU law with the Convention.
This, it is suggested, would normally be the case wherever an applicant makes an
argument to that effect unless that argument is outlandish. If in such a case the
EU expresses its wish to join the proceedings as co-respondent, the ECtHR will
normally have to accede to that wish.
(iii) Member States as Co-respondents
The co-respondent mechanism will also operate where the application is dir-
ected against the EU as respondent. The Member States can become
co-respondents in such cases if the compatibility of a provision of primary
EU law with the Convention is in question. This is obviously a reference to
the situation in the Matthews case and an acknowledgement of the fact that only
the Member States are capable of remedying the violation. After all, if a provi-
sion contained in the Treaties is held to be in violation of the Convention, it
would need to be amended according to Article 48 of the Treaty on European
Union (TEU). Thus making the Member States co-respondents in such a case
39 CDDH-UE(2011)06.
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makes sense in order to ensure an effective and efficient human rights protec-
tion. A point on which neither the draft nor the explanatory report are unam-
biguous, however, is whether it is necessary that all Member States ask the
ECtHR to be joined as co-respondents or whether it suffices if only some of
them (or indeed one of them) do. Judging from the mechanism’s rationale, only
an involvement of all the Member States would ensure that the judgment could
be executed against all of them, which would be necessary in order to secure a
Treaty amendment. On the other hand, such a requirement would leave the
mechanism almost unworkable given that all twenty-seven Member States
would have to have expressed their wish to join proceedings before proceedings
are finished.40 Were the ECtHR to wait until all Member States have declared
whether they wish to join, proceedings might be unduly delayed. In addition,
another rationale of the co-respondent mechanism might be served even by
having only some Member States join proceedings: they would be able to
defend the case from the point of view of the Member States. Moreover, a
systematic argument can be made. For cases in which proceedings are instigated
against the EU and one or more of its Member States, Article 3(4) of the draft
agreement allows for a change of status of any respondent to that of
co-respondent, ie it allows for a change of status of one Member State to that
of co-respondent alongside the EU as (main) respondent. Since the conditions
for becoming co-respondent under Article 3(4) are the same as under the other
provisions save for the fact that the co-respondent was initially nominated as a
(main) respondent, there should be no material difference. This suggests that it
is admissible under Article 3(3) if only some Member States ask the Court to
join proceedings.
One might be tempted, however, to raise two questions regarding the sens-
ibility of the co-respondent mechanism in the scenario foreseen in Article 3(3)
of the draft. The first question is why the EU should be held responsible for
violations of the Convention by primary law in the first place. After all, it is
unable to remove such violations without the consent of the Member States.41
There are three arguments which can be advanced in favour of such responsi-
bility. The first relates to the aim of the accession agreement which is to treat the
EU as far as possible like any other party to the Convention.42 As a result, it
should be responsible for violations of the Convention rooted in its own con-
stitutional documents. Furthermore, excluding the EU’s responsibility for pri-
mary law would force the ECtHR to decide in each and every case brought
against the EU where exactly the violation was located, which might conflict
40 On the last possibility to make a request, cf above.
41 This seems to have been the argument made by the French government which initially opposed a
responsibility of the EU for its primary law: French Senate, Communication de M. Robert Badinter
sur le mandat de ne´gociation (E 5248) 25 May 2010, available at: <http://www.senat.fr/europe/
r25052010.html#toc1> accessed 13 December 2011.
42 Explanatory report, CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 7.
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with the autonomy of the EU’s legal order.43 The final argument is that even
though the EU cannot amend its own Treaties, its institutions are still involved
in the amendment procedure laid down in Article 48 TEU. Extending the
binding reach of a judgment to the EU’s institutions is thus wise. Thus there
are good legal and symbolic arguments for the EU’s responsibility for its own
primary law.
But this does not answer the second question why the role of the Member
States should be that of co-respondents rather than that of ‘ordinary’ respond-
ents. As explained above, one of the main motivations for devising the
co-respondent mechanism was to prevent the need for a decision on the division
of competence between the EU and its Member States. Yet in the case of pri-
mary law this aim could equally have been attained by bringing a case against
both EU and Member States as ‘ordinary’ respondents since it would not be
necessary for the ECtHR to pronounce on that question as both EU and
Member States would be fully responsible. But it seems that another aspect of
the co-respondent mechanism was decisive: there is no need to exhaust domestic
remedies in the co-respondent’s legal order. At first glance, this rationale seems
odd as we are dealing with primary EU law against which there is not normally a
domestic remedy. But there are some Member States which recognize a possi-
bility to challenge the compliance of the Treaties with the Member State’s
constitution.44 Thus the extension of the co-respondent mechanism to these
types of situations can pre-empt an argument by a joint respondent that the
applicant failed to exhaust remedies in its legal order.
(iv) Appraisal of the Co-respondent Mechanism
Apart from the issues raised in the preceding paragraphs, some general points
will be made in this section. They relate to the voluntary character of the
co-respondent status, the division of responsibility between EU and Member
States after accession, and problems surrounding cases alleging a violation of the
ECHR by omission.
Voluntary Character
The draft is explicit about the voluntary character of the co-respondent mech-
anism when it states that a party shall become co-respondent only at its own
request. The rationale given in the explanatory report is that a party cannot be
forced into proceedings where it was not named in the initial application.45 Yet
43 Lock, n 15, 1038.
44 For instance, the Verfassungsbeschwerde before the German Federal Constitutional Court can
under certain conditions serve to that end.
45 CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 47.
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this argument is based on a mere technicality and is hardly convincing.46 There
is no reason why an applicant should not ask another party to join proceedings
at a later stage provided that the procedural rights of that party are respected,
especially regarding their right to be heard.
Moreover, it is argued that the draft partly contradicts the rationale for the
co-respondent mechanism. According to the explanatory report, the main
reason for its introduction is to avoid gaps in the participation, accountability,
and enforceability in the Convention system.47 But a voluntary mechanism
leads to exactly such gaps. The EU or a Member State may well decide to
steer clear of proceedings even though they would be responsible for the alleged
violation. The fact that the applicant can nominate both from the outset does
not remedy this problem since it would force the applicant to exhaust domestic
remedies in all legal orders concerned, which is not only costly but also
time-consuming. It should especially be borne in mind that an applicant
before the ECtHR does not need to be represented by a lawyer so that she
may not even be remotely aware of these requirements. It follows that the
current draft only achieves sub-optimal results regarding the efficiency of
human rights protection for individuals.
There is furthermore the danger that a Member State raises the defence that it
was not responsible for the violation as the violation was rooted in its obligations
under EU law and it had no discretion. The draft and the explanatory report are
silent regarding this possibility. It is important that the ECtHR would not
accept such a defence. Otherwise, the human rights protection as regards EU
law would risk being less effective than it is now. It is suggested that the draft
presupposes that no such defence should be possible. But lacking an explicit
statement to that effect, there is no guarantee that this will be the case.
Moreover, one can doubt that the voluntary character of the co-respondent
status is fully in compliance with Protocol 8 to the Lisbon Treaty. After all, that
Protocol demands that the accession agreement should ‘ensure’ that individual
applications are correctly addressed to the EU or the Member States as appro-
priate. If the status of co-respondent is voluntary, it is not guaranteed that cases
are addressed to the entity which is really responsible for the violation.
Of course, the internal rules on the EU’s membership of the ECHR are still
not clear. But even if these rules provide for a duty on the part of the EU to
become co-respondent in cases where the alleged violation is found in EU law,
such a solution would be unsatisfactory as it would entrust the co-respondent,
who has allegedly committed a violation of human rights, with the assessment of
whether it should join proceedings or not. There would still be no way of
46 This author has voiced considerable criticism of the voluntary character of the status of
co-respondent elsewhere, cf T Lock, ‘EU Accession to the ECHR: Implications for Judicial
Review in Strasbourg’ [2010] ELRev 777, 793.
47 CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 33.
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forcing the EU to join as co-respondent and an applicant might be left without
effective protection.
Division of Responsibility Post-Accession
Having outlined the different facets of the co-respondent mechanism, it is apt to
enter into a thought experiment in order to predict the division of responsibility
between EU and Member States post-accession and in order to assess the prac-
tical relevance of the co-respondent mechanism. For this purpose, a hypothetical
case study will be conducted consisting of scenarios which in the past gave rise to
ECtHR decisions relating to EU law and scenarios likely to reach the ECtHR at
some point after accession.
If the accession agreement is adopted in its current form, the main issue for
deciding who is responsible will be the question of jurisdiction. Article 1 ECHR
provides that the High Contracting Parties secure to everyone within their jur-
isdiction the rights and freedoms contained in the ECHR. It follows that the EU
would only be responsible where an alleged violation occurred within its juris-
diction. The same would be true for the Member States. Both EU and Member
State would thus only be responsible alongside one another where the alleged
violation occurred in the jurisdiction of both. It is therefore necessary to briefly
explain what is meant by the term ‘jurisdiction’. The ECtHR understands the
concept of jurisdiction as a concept of international law.48 Jurisdiction in inter-
national law is commonly defined as the authority of the State to regulate the
conduct of persons by means of its own domestic law.49 If this concept of
jurisdiction is equally applied to the EU, a person would be in its jurisdiction
where an EU act, be it legislative, executive, or judicial, regulates their conduct.
This means in effect, that wherever EU law is applicable, a person is within the
jurisdiction of the EU.50 As the case-law on the Member States’ responsibility
for EU acts shows, situations can occur where the Member States would be
responsible as well. This is either the case where the Member States have im-
plemented EU legislation51 or where a court of a Member State has made a
preliminary reference to the ECJ.52 Reflecting this, the explanatory report to the
draft agreement mentions three cases ‘which might have certainly required the
48 Bankovic and others v Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey and the United
Kingdom [GC], no 52207/99, ECHR 2001-XII, para 57; recently confirmed in Al-Skeini and others v
United Kingdom, no 55721/07, 7 July 2011, para 131.
49 V Lowe, International Law (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007), 170; M Milanovic, ‘From
Compromise to Principle: Clarifying the concept of state jurisdiction in human rights treaties’
[2008] HRLR 411, at 420; Milanovic is highly critical of the ECtHR’s adoption of this definition
and argues that it is too restrictive for a human rights treaty by being primarily based on territory.
50 In the discussions following the adoption of the draft, the United Kingdom made a proposal to
clarify what ‘jurisdiction’ means in regard to the EU, cf Council of the EU, doc no 16385/11. This
does not seem necessary given the ECtHR’s case-law on the matter.
51 Bosphorus, n 12.
52 Kokkelvisserij v Netherlands, no 13645/05, 20 January 2009.
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application of the co-respondent mechanism’.53 They are Matthews,54
Bosphorus,55 and Kokkelvisserij.56 The factual scenarios underlying these cases
will be used to illustrate the functioning of the co-respondent mechanism.
As a preliminary point, it is obvious that in cases like Connolly where there
was no Member State involvement, nothing will change: they will remain out-
side the Member States’ jurisdiction, so that only the EU will be responsible. As
explained above, the mechanism presupposes that the Member States continue
to be responsible for violations of the Convention brought about by EU law
where they implemented such legislation whether they had discretion or not.
Otherwise accession by the EU to the ECHR as conceived in the draft agree-
ment would lead to new gaps in the human rights protection, which accession
aims at removing.
In a scenario like Bosphorus, where a Member State implemented an EU
Regulation, the action would occur within the respondent Member State’s jur-
isdiction so that it would remain responsible for the violation. The EU would be
free to join proceedings as a co-respondent. A different question is, however,
whether under the new rules the applicant could choose not to hold the imple-
menting Member State responsible in a Bosphorus-type scenario but the EU
instead arguing that the legislation as such was in violation of the applicant’s
Convention rights. Firstly, the applicant would have to be within the jurisdic-
tion of the EU according to Article 1 ECHR. Considering that an EU
Regulation is directly applicable and thus regulates the conduct of persons on
the territory of the EU (ie in the Member States) this would be the case. Second,
in order to bring an admissible application, the applicant would have to be a
victim of a violation according to Article 34 ECHR. This would be more
problematic here since the applicant would bring the case against a piece of
legislation and not an implementing act. For a person to be considered a victim
where there is no implementing act, the ECtHR requires that a provision applies
automatically, ie without further implementation57 or that its very existence
continuously and directly affects the individual.58 It follows that where a pro-
vision merely grants national authorities the power to act, the applicant would
not normally be considered a victim since his legal position is only affected once
this power is used. Bosphorus is a case in point. The mere existence of a power of
Member State authorities to impound an aircraft would not have affected
Bosphorus’ right to property. Only once the authorities had made the order
to impound the aircraft were the carrier’s rights affected. Thus post-accession an
applicant in the same situation as Bosphorus would not be able to bring a case
53 CDDH-UE(2011)16, fn 18.
54 Matthews, n 11.
55 Bosphorus, n 12.
56 Kokkelvisserij, n 52.
57 Marckx v Belgium, no 6833/74, Series A no 31, para 27.
58 Dudgeon v United Kingdom, no 7525/76, Series A no 45, para 41.
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directly against the EU, but would have to address it to the Member State. The
Bosphorus scenario is thus a prime example of a case in which the involvement of
the EU as co-respondent makes sense. This is confirmed by the wording of
Article 3(2) of the draft agreement, which says that the co-respondent mechan-
ism would notably apply where the violation could have been avoided only by
disregarding EU law.59
However, there is no requirement in the wording of Article 3(2) of the draft
agreement that there must not be any Member State discretion. This is con-
firmed by the drafting history of the provision. In contrast to the first revised
draft, which was clearly modelled on Bosphorus60 and required the existence of a
normative conflict between a Member State’s obligations under EU law and
under the ECHR, no such requirement is contained in the final version of the
draft agreement on accession. Since many EU law obligations leave a degree of
discretion to the Member State, there are potentially a lot more cases capable of
engaging the EU as co-respondent than if the co-respondent mechanism had
been restricted to cases where there was no Member State discretion.61
The facts underlying the recent M.S.S. case, however, show that the
co-respondent mechanism would not be applicable in all cases where a
Member State has implemented its obligations under EU law.62 The applicant
was an asylum-seeker who entered the EU via Greece and applied for asylum in
Belgium. On the basis of Article 10(1) of the EU’s Dublin Regulation,63
Belgium sent him back to Greece since it is the responsibility of the Member
State through which the asylum-seeker first entered the EU to examine his
application for asylum.64 The ECtHR quoted the Dublin Convention and
other EU law among the ‘relevant law’ for its decision. But a request by the
EU to be admitted as co-respondent would not have been allowed since the
compatibility of the Dublin Regulation with the Convention was not at issue in
the proceedings. The applicant only claimed that his treatment by Greece and
Belgium violated the Convention. No argument was made regarding the com-
patibility of the Dublin Regulation and there was no reason to assume that the
relevant provisions of the Dublin Regulation fell foul of the standards required
by the ECHR. The M.S.S. case shows that the co-respondent mechanism will
normally only be engaged where an applicant claimed that the legal basis for
Member State action contradicts the ECHR. Thus, for instance, in a case
59 Emphasis added.
60 Article 4, CDDH-UE(2011)06, which requires for the co-respondent mechanism to apply that
‘[. . .] an act or omission underlying an alleged violation notified could only have been avoided by
disregarding an obligation under [EU] law [. . .]’.
61 A further question would be whether the ECtHR should continue its Bosphorus presumption.
There are good arguments that it should not, cf Lock, n 46, 797.
62 M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece [GC], no 30696/09, 21 January 2011.
63 Council Regulation 343/2003/EC [2003] OJ L 50/1.
64 As was rightly noted by the ECtHR, Belgium was not under a strict obligation to send back the
applicant. It could have decided to investigate the case itself but chose not to do so, M.S.S., para 339.
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brought against an EU Arrest Warrant, the involvement of the EU would
depend upon whether the applicant also alleges that the Council’s Framework
Decision 2002/584/JHA was also in violation of the ECHR and not only its
application by the Member State’s authorities. The only way of involving the
EU in cases like M.S.S. would be as a third-party intervener.65
In contrast to Bosphorus and M.S.S., the Matthews case dealt with the respon-
sibility of a Member State for a provision of EU primary law. The applicant
complained against not being able to register as a voter in the elections to the
European Parliament. Her application to that effect had been rejected by the
authorities of Gibraltar whose actions were attributable to the United Kingdom.
In the original case, the United Kingdom was held responsible for the violation
as the European Community’s 1976 Act on Direct Elections was part of primary
EU law, for which the Member States are responsible. If a case like Matthews
arose after accession, the applicant would still be able to hold the Member State
responsible as the rejection to add her to the electoral register must be con-
sidered an implementing act so that the alleged violation would occur within the
jurisdiction of the Member State. But the violation would equally occur within
the jurisdiction of the EU. In contrast to the situation in Bosphorus, the appli-
cant would also be the victim of a violation by the EU since the 1976 Act
directly determined her legal position. The applicant would thus have a choice
as to whom to hold responsible. As regards the co-respondent mechanism, the
EU would be eligible to become co-respondent where the case is brought against
a Member State. Equally, where the case is brought against the EU, one or more
Member States would be able to become co-respondents.66
A provision of primary law which is likely to come under attack after acces-
sion is Article 263(4) TFEU. It allows individuals to challenge acts of the EU
institutions where an act is addressed to them, where it concerns them directly
and individually, or where it is a regulatory act which entails no implementing
measures. In its famous UPA ruling, the ECJ confirmed its old case-law67 that
an applicant is only individually concerned where she belongs to a ‘closed group’
of applicants, ie persons with ‘certain attributes peculiar to them, or by reason of
a factual situation which differentiates them from all other persons and distin-
guishes them individually in the same way as the addressee’.68 Under ex Article
230(4) TEC, this meant that where there was an act which did not entail
implementing measures, ie which was self-executing, it could not be directly
challenged by an affected individual before the ECJ. In UPA the ECJ argued
that this was not in violation of the right to an effective remedy guaranteed by
65 The explanatory report states that the third-party intervention ‘may often be the most appro-
priate way to involve the EU’, CDDH-UE(2011)16, para 40.
66 On the question whether all of them would have to become co-respondents, cf above.
67 Starting with Case 25/62, Plaumann v Commission [1963] ECR 95.
68 Case C-50/00 P, Unio´n de Pequen˜os Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6719, para 36.
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Articles 6 and 13 ECHR despite severe doubts as to that result raised by
Advocate General Jacobs.69 The Lisbon Treaty made an attempt at plugging
this potential hole in the judicial protection of individuals by introducing a right
to challenge ‘regulatory acts’ which do not entail implementing measures. But
according to a recent decision by the General Court regulatory acts are
non-legislative acts,70 so that in cases where eg a Council regulation does not
require implementing measures, there is still no possibility for an individual to
directly challenge it before the ECJ. Were an unsuccessful applicant to bring a
case to the ECtHR claiming violation of Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, she would
only be able to bring the case against the EU as the main respondent since due
to a lack of an implementing measure the violation did not occur in the juris-
diction of the Member States.71 They would, however, be able to join as
co-respondents.
Kokkelvisserij, the final case in this analysis, differs from the previously men-
tioned cases. The applicant cooperative essentially alleged a failure to legislate
and did not claim that a provision of EU law restricted it in its rights. The
applicant argued that it should have been given an opportunity to respond to
the submissions of the Advocate General before the ECJ, which allegedly vio-
lated its right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 ECHR. It argued in par-
ticular that Article 61 of the ECJ’s Rules of Procedure granted the ECJ
discretion over the reopening of the oral procedure which was in violation of
the Convention since it deprived the applicant of a guaranteed right to respond.
In essence, the applicant therefore argued that the Rules of Procedure were
insufficient and violated the Convention. The Rules of Procedure are of a sui
generis legal nature since they are laid down by the Court itself with the approval
of the Council.72 The case therefore dealt with an alleged violation attributable
to the EU. The only reason why the ECtHR considered that the alleged viola-
tion occurred within the respondent State’s jurisdiction was that a domestic
court had made a request for a preliminary ruling to the ECJ under Article
267 TFEU. Assuming that an EU Member State would still be responsible in
cases which came before the ECJ by way of a preliminary reference after acces-
sion, the question is whether the EU would be able to become co-respondent.
Since the Rules of Procedure, despite their sui generis nature, must be regarded as
‘a provision of European Union law’ the compatibility of which with the
Convention was in question, on a strict reading of the wording of Article
3(2) of the draft agreement the co-respondent mechanism would have been
applicable. But the scenario in Kokkelvisserij is anomalous for two reasons:
69 Case C-50/00 P, Unio´n de Pequen˜os Agricultores [2002] ECR I-6681, Opinion of AG Jacobs.
70 Case T-18/10, Inuit Tapiritt Katanami v Parliament and Council, 6 September 2011,
paras 36–56 (under appeal as Case C-583/11).
71 This would be similar to Connolly, above.
72 B Wegener, ‘Art. 253 AEUV’ in C Calliess and M Ruffert (eds), EUV/AEUV (CH Beck:
Mu¨nchen 2011), para 8.
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first, the only reason why the Member State could be taken to the ECtHR was
that its own domestic court had requested a preliminary ruling. Had the case
come before the ECJ by way of a different procedure, the Member State would
not have been responsible. Second, there was already some (allegedly insuffi-
cient) legislation in place, the compatibility of which with the ECHR was in
question. Thus the question of compatibility of that legislation with the
Convention could be raised which is one of the preconditions for the involve-
ment of a co-respondent. Yet in cases where not even insufficient legislation
exists, it would be questionable whether the co-respondent mechanism would
apply.
The example of Kokkelvisserij thus brings us to the more general question of
how alleged violations by omission would be dealt with after accession.
The Case of Omissions
It is well established in the case-law of the ECtHR that the Convention is not
only violated where a High Contracting Party actively interferes with an indi-
vidual’s rights but also where it fails to act provided that the Convention con-
tains a positive obligation to do so.73 Cases concerning the EU can either deal
with alleged failures to legislate or with failures by the executive to act. The latter
would be relatively unproblematic. Where an applicant alleges that one of the
EU’s institutions has failed to act, the addressee of a subsequent application to
the ECtHR would clearly be the EU.74 But where failures to legislate are con-
cerned, the correct addressee cannot easily be determined. The problem with
legislative competences is that they are divided between the EU and its Member
States so that both could potentially be held responsible in the ECtHR. The
provisions in the draft agreement do not specifically mention omissions but it is
clear from its preamble and the explanations to it that violations of the ECHR
by omission are covered, too.75
The problem is that strictly speaking, the Member States are not responsible
for violations of the Convention by omission where the EU had the exclusive
competence to act. The reverse is true for the EU where the Member States had
the exclusive competence to act. If such a case came before the ECtHR, the
Court might therefore be prompted to investigate the division of competences
between EU and Member States. However, such an investigation would violate
the autonomy of EU law as it would necessitate a binding interpretation of EU
73 eg Artico v Italy, no 6694/74, Series A no 37, para 33; Marckx v Belgium, no 6833/74, Series A no
31, para 31; Gaskin v UK, no 10454/83, Series A no 160, para 41; Airey v Ireland, no 6289/73, Series
A no 32, paras 31–33; X and Y v The Netherlands, no 8978/80, Series A no 91, paras 24–30; Lo´pez
Ostra v Spain, no 16798/90, Series A no 303-C, para 51.
74 The applicant would of course be required to first exhaust the remedy provided in Art 265(3)
TFEU.
75 Its preamble expressly recognizes the right of individuals to submit omissions of the EU to the
external control of the ECtHR.
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law by the ECtHR.76 This could be avoided if the co-respondent mechanism
were to ensure that both could be held responsible.
Yet the formulation in the article concerning the co-respondent mechanism
does not seem to cover all potential cases in this respect. In order to show this it
is necessary to distinguish different scenarios in which an applicant may allege a
violation of his Convention rights by omission. One scenario concerns cases
where a provision of EU law mandates action by a Member State. In such a case,
the applicant can hold the Member State responsible for a failure to comply.
The EU would not be able to become co-respondent since EU law would not be
challenged. Another scenario would concern cases where no legal provision
exists, either at EU level or at Member State level. This scenario would differ
from that in Kokkelvisserij where by coincidence there was already some legis-
lation in place which the applicant argued insufficiently protected her rights.
However, on a literal reading the mechanism would be inapplicable since in this
scenario no claim would be made that a provision of EU law was not in com-
pliance with the Convention since the non-existence of such a provision is the
problem. Thus there is a lacuna in the provision concerning the co-respondent
mechanism which raises doubts as to the compliance of the draft agreement with
Article 1 of Protocol 8 to the Lisbon Treaty, which demands that the accession
agreement should ensure that applications are addressed to the correct entity.
With regard to cases of alleged omissions to legislate arising outside the rather
specific circumstances of Kokkelvisserij the draft agreement fails to deliver on this
point.
Overall Comment
The preceding analysis has shown that the division of responsibility between the
EU and the Member States after accession will not always be easy to determine.
This is largely due to the ECtHR’s understanding of jurisdiction and the limi-
tations of the co-respondent mechanism, especially regarding its voluntary
nature. The consequence is that the determination of the correct respondent
can at times appear random. This is probably best illustrated by the peculiar set
of facts in the Kokkelvisserij case, where the only reason why a Member State
could be held responsible for an alleged procedural deficit of an EU institution
(the Court of Justice) was because the case had reached the ECJ by way of a
preliminary reference. While this is a less serious issue, the question of who
should be responsible for legislative inaction remains largely unresolved. A dif-
ferently designed co-respondent mechanism would be capable of addressing all
these points. Two changes would appear appropriate. First, the co-respondent
should not be allowed to refuse being joined to proceedings. Second, the scope
of application of the mechanism ought to be extended: wherever a question of
EU law arises, the respondent should be able to request a potential
76 cf Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, paras 34–35.
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co-respondent to join. This would avoid gaps in the responsibility and, import-
antly, it would remove the danger of the ECtHR delineating the competences
between EU and Member States.77
B. Prior Involvement of the ECJ where the EU is Co-respondent
A further novelty which accession will bring is closely connected to the
co-respondent mechanism: the possibility of an involvement of the ECJ in
such proceedings creating an institutional link between the two European
courts. As has been pointed out above, one of the advantages for an applicant
in cases where the EU is co-respondent before the ECtHR is that he does not
need to exhaust the remedies available before the ECJ. Exhaustion of domestic
remedies in the respondent Member State is sufficient. This can lead to a situ-
ation where the compatibility of a provision of EU law with the Convention is
assessed without the ECJ having had a chance to pronounce on the question.
Presumably, in the vast majority of cases the ECJ will have been involved via the
preliminary reference procedure laid down in Article 267 TFEU, but such
involvement is not guaranteed. National courts are under a duty to make a
reference either where they are courts of last resort78 or, independently of their
place in the hierarchy, where the validity of EU legislation is at issue since they
must not infringe the ECJ’s monopoly to declare such legislation void.79 But
these rules are not watertight. There are a number of conceivable reasons why in
situations where the co-respondent mechanism applies a national court may not
have made a reference. One (unlikely) possibility is that the national court was
unaware of its duty to make a reference. In a more probable scenario a national
court would come to the conclusion that the provision of EU law in question
was not incompatible with fundamental rights and was therefore valid. In con-
trast to determinations of invalidity, national courts have a right to consider
provisions of EU law valid on their own devices.80 This situation might
arise relatively often since the test for the applicability of the co-respondent
mechanism is rather superficial: it would be sufficient for the co-respondent
mechanism to apply if it appears that the applicant’s allegations call into ques-
tion the compatibility of a provision of EU law with the Convention. Given the
tendency of counsel to support their client’s case with every conceivable argu-
ment, such calling into question is prone to happen relatively often. Claims of
this kind may often appear far-fetched and may thus induce the national court
to ignore them. Thus there is a realistic chance that the ECtHR might rule on
77 A more detailed discussion of this proposal can be found in Lock, n 46, 786.
78 Article 267(3) TFEU.
79 Case 314/85, Firma Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lu¨beck-Ost [1987] ECR 4199, para 15.
80 Ibid at para 14; under the draft agreement, the CILFIT case-law (Case 283/81 [1982] ECR
3415) would not play an important role since the co-respondent mechanism would only be applic-
able where the validity of a provision of EU law is at stake and not in cases concerning a mere
interpretation of EU law.
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the compatibility of a provision of EU law with human rights, and thus indir-
ectly on the validity of that provision under EU fundamental rights law, without
the ECJ having had a chance to remedy the violation.81
Against this background, the Presidents of the two European Courts issued a
joint communication urging for a flexible procedure allowing the ECJ to carry
out an internal review before the ECtHR has carried out its external review.82
The Presidents named the principles of subsidiarity as the underlying reason for
a prior involvement of the ECJ.83 This argument, however, is not compelling.
While it is true that a review by the ECJ might remedy the violation and thus
reduce the workload of the ECtHR, the introduction of a specific procedure
guaranteeing a prior involvement of the ECJ leads to a privileging of the EU’s
legal order over the legal orders of other parties to the Convention. The fact that
the ECJ may not get involved in some cases is down to a deficit of protection in
the EU’s legal order in that there is often no possibility for an individual to
have the legislation at issue reviewed in any other way but by a preliminary
reference.84 If the EU considers this to be problematic it should try to fix the
problem within its own legal system. Moreover, there are parties to the ECHR
where a similar situation to that of the EU exists. For instance, in Italy there is
no direct access to the Italian Constitutional Court for individuals but only
indirect access through another court. But there is no special procedure before
the ECtHR to accommodate for this. Thus there have been cases in which an
individual was able to file an admissible application to the ECtHR against Italy
without a previous decision of the Constitutional Court.85 The prior involve-
ment seems to go against this spirit.
The drafters of the accession agreement apparently did not share these con-
cerns and adopted the position of the two presidents.86 The accession agreement
contains the following Article 3(6):
In proceedings to which the European Union is co-respondent, if the Court of
Justice of the European Union has not yet assessed the compatibility with the
81 Of course, the number of cases would still be low as the application of the co-respondent
mechanism and thus of the prior involvement mechanism would depend on the case actually
being communicated, cf above.
82 Joint communication from the Presidents Skouris and Costa <http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/
upload/docs/application/pdf/2011-02/cedh_cjue_english.pdf> accessed 13 December 2011; simi-
lar arguments were advanced previously, eg by former ECJ Judge Timmermans, L’adhe´sion de l’Union
Europe´enne a` la Convention europe´enne des Droits de l’homme, intervention at a hearing before the
European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 18 March 2010 <http://www.euro
parl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201003/20100324ATT71235/20100324ATT71235EN
.pdf> accessed 13 December 2011.
83 Ibid.
84 The only possibility is the (still) rather narrowly phrased Art 263(4) TFEU.
85 Article 134 of the Italian Constitution and legge costituzionale 9 febbraio 1948 , n 1; Brozicek v
Italy, no 10964/84, 19 December 1989; Immobiliare Saffi, no 22774/93, 28 July 1999; de Jorio v
Italy, no 73936/01, 6 March 2003.
86 CDDH-UE (2011)16, para 58.
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Convention rights at issue of the provision of European Union law as under
paragraph 2, then sufficient time shall be afforded for the Court of Justice of
the European Union to make such an assessment and thereafter for the parties
to make observations to the Court. The European Union shall ensure that
such assessment is made quickly so that the proceedings before the Court are
not unduly delayed. This paragraph shall not affect the powers of the Court.87
This draft provokes three questions: (1) which circumstances trigger the pro-
cedure; (2) what should be the procedure before the ECJ; and (3) what are
consequences of the ECJ’s decision for the proceedings before the ECtHR?
(i) Circumstances Triggering the Prior Involvement
It is clear from the wording of the provision that there can only be a prior
involvement in cases where the EU is co-respondent. But this provokes the
question of how to deal with a situation where both the EU and the Member
State are ‘normal’ respondents. Such a situation can arise where the applicant
nominates both as respondents from the outset and the EU does not opt to
become co-respondent.88 As we have seen, in such a case the applicant must
exhaust the domestic remedies in the Member State and in the EU. Thus one
might think there cannot be an issue. However, where, for instance, the appli-
cant’s case is based on a violation of the Convention brought about by an EU
Directive or by primary law, she has no domestic remedy under EU law.89 If in
the proceedings before the court of the Member State the national court does
not make a reference to the ECJ, the case would be decided by the ECtHR
without an involvement of the ECJ. This solution compares oddly to a situation
in which the EU is co-respondent since in such a case the ECtHR would have to
give the ECJ the opportunity to make a decision, the only difference between
the two cases being the status of the EU in the proceedings. One could, of
course, consider applying the co-respondent mechanism by analogy. But it is
submitted that this would privilege the EU even more since it is entirely in its
own hands to decide that it wishes to be a co-respondent which would bring
with it the ‘perk’ of having the case reviewed by the ECJ as well. This would not
only be compatible with the wording of the provision on prior involvement but
also in comparison with cases in which the EU is the sole respondent.90 Here,
87 CDDH-UE(2011)10.
88 This argument assumes that a situation is conceivable where a ‘victim’ according to Art 34
ECHR can be in the jurisdiction of the EU and of a Member State at the same time.
89 Where Regulations are concerned, the latest case-law of the General Court on the newly for-
mulated Art 263(4) TFEU suggests that she would not have a remedy either, cf Case T-18/10, Inuit
Tapiritt Katanami v Parliament and Council, 6 September 2011, not yet reported, para 39 et seq; Case
T-262/10, Microban v Commission, 25 October 2011, not yet reported, para 21.
90 Admittedly, in cases where there is implementing action by a Member State it would be stra-
tegically inadvisable to hold only the EU responsible since it may well have happened that the
Member State added another violation when implementing the provision of EU law.
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too, the applicant need only exhaust the domestic remedies available under EU
law, of which there may be none available to her. Thus the prior involvement
should only occur in strict accordance with the wording of Article 3(6) of the
draft.
Regarding the substantive requirement, the ECJ may be involved where it ‘has
not yet assessed the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of the
provision of European Union law’. This requirement points to a further com-
plication in that it does not simply ask whether the ECJ has ruled in the case,
but whether the ECJ has also assessed the rights at issue. The background
appears to be that under the preliminary reference procedure, the ECJ is limited
to answering the questions put before it, which may not have dealt with the
compatibility of the provision with the fundamental rights. In such a situation, a
further involvement of the ECJ may thus be required. But under which exact
circumstances must the ECJ be deemed to have pronounced on the Convention
rights at issue? Since the ECJ will normally base its findings on the rights
contained in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and not directly on the
Convention, further analysis will become necessary. In making its decision
whether to involve the ECJ, the ECtHR will need to scrutinize a prior prelim-
inary ruling as to whether the discussion by the ECJ in substance dealt with the
Convention rights at issue in the case before the ECtHR. But it is submitted
that the ECtHR’s task will not be too onerous. While the question of corres-
ponding rights between Charter and Convention is somewhat debated,91 with
regard to the necessity of a prior involvement of the ECtHR it will only have to
assess whether the rights protected in the ECHR have been substantively covered
by the ECJ. This examination is comparable with that carried out by the
ECtHR when dealing with the exhaustion of domestic remedies. The Court
already requires applicants to raise all their grievances before the national in-
stances. As far as they fail to do so, their complaint is declared inadmissible. The
scrutiny to be carried out regarding the prior involvement will be substantially
the same.
(ii) Procedure before the ECJ
The draft is silent on the procedure before the ECJ where the ECJ is involved
under the prior involvement provision. The details of the ECJ’s involvement
will have to be laid down in the EU’s internal rules on ECHR membership. At
the time of writing, there have not yet been any official pronouncements on the
matter. It is clear, however, that the ECJ can only be given new functions as far
as the autonomy of EU law permits. In this respect it is of importance that the
new procedure does not lead to a hidden Treaty amendment. The ECJ sum-
marized its autonomy case-law in Opinion 1/00 and stated in particular that ‘the
91 cf Art 52(3) CFR; instructive on this question: P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (Oxford University
Press: Oxford, 2010), 232–3.
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essential character of the powers of the Community and its institutions remain
unaltered’.92 A detailed discussion of this question would go beyond the remit
of this paper.93 On a narrow view of the autonomy of the EU legal system, the
prior involvement of the ECJ would have to be based on already established
procedures since otherwise a Treaty amendment would be necessary. One way
would be to allow for a prior involvement of the ECJ by putting the European
Commission in charge of instigating proceedings in accordance with Article 263
TFEU. The Commission would thereby challenge the validity of the provision
of EU law which appears to be incompatible with the Convention. This way, the
ECJ would not be given any new powers so that there would be no conflict with
the autonomy principle. And since the Commission would probably represent
the EU before the ECtHR,94 it would be familiar with the case and the ques-
tions at issue and thus be in an ideal position to decide whether to involve the
ECJ. But there may be issues with the two-month time limit for challenging
Union acts laid down in Article 263(6) TFEU.
One could equally adopt a broader view, allowing for the creation of a new
procedure for prior involvement to be laid down in the internal rules. In order
not to violate the autonomy of the EU’s legal order, one would have to argue
that the prior involvement was implicitly authorized by Article 6(2) TEU, which
mandates accession of the EU to the ECHR. At first glance, this view seems to
be far-fetched. After all, Article 6(2) TEU is chiefly an external competence and
can be read as a reaction to Opinion 2/94, in which the ECJ stated that an
explicit competence was needed for the Union to accede to the ECHR. The
wording of Article 6(2) TEU does not suggest that it also grants competence to
the EU’s institutions to create a new procedure for the prior involvement of the
ECJ. But given that the ECJ itself has twice demanded that such a procedure be
introduced,95 and given that the new procedure enhances its own powers, it is
likely that it will not strike it down in a forthcoming opinion on accession.
(iii) Consequences of a Decision by the ECJ
The final question is what the consequences of a decision by the ECJ would be
for the proceedings before the ECtHR. It is clear that a finding by the ECJ that a
provision of EU law is compatible with fundamental rights would have no effect
on the ECtHR as it cannot replace the external control exercised by
92 cf Opinion 1/00 [2002] ECR I-3493, para 12.
93 A discussion can be found in Lock, n 15, 1045 et seq.
94 The United Kingdom is reluctant to accept that the EU should be represented by the
Commission in all cases, cf United Kingdom non-paper, Council of the EU doc no 1563/11.
95 Discussion document on certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; Joint Communication
from Presidents Costa and Skouris, both available at <http://curia.europa.eu> (accessed 7 June
2012).
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Strasbourg.96 However, it is still open what would happen if the ECJ came to
the conclusion that the provision in question was incompatible with fundamen-
tal rights and if it were to declare it void ex tunc as a consequence. The draft
agreement does not address this eventuality. The main question in this connec-
tion is whether the applicant would lose his victim status with the consequence
of the case becoming inadmissible. However, there is one problem with such a
result: the decision by the national court which confirmed the violation would
remain unaffected and would continue to stand as res judicata. Thus a mere
finding by the ECJ that the provision of EU law at question was invalid would
not suffice. If nothing further happened, the applicant would still have to be
considered a victim for the purposes of the Convention. In contrast, where the
national decisions have been revoked, eg where proceedings before the national
courts are reopened, the applicant will lose her victim status. A similar situation
occurred in a case before the European Commission on Human Rights
(ECommHR).97 In that case a provision of national law was revoked after an
applicant had been convicted on its basis. While the ECommHR ruled that the
applicant had lost his victim status this was not simply because the legislation
had been revoked but because the court decisions had been quashed, too.98
C. The EU’s Involvement in the Bodies of the Council of Europe
The accession agreement foresees participation of the EU in those bodies of the
Council of Europe which carry out functions with regard to the ECHR. These
are the Committee of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council
of Europe. Since in contrast to all other parties to the ECHR, the EU will not
become a party to the Council of Europe it will not automatically be represented
in those bodies and rules for the EU’s involvement needed to be drawn up.
The ECHR assigns a number of functions to the Council of Europe’s
Committee of Ministers. Most importantly, the Committee of Ministers super-
vises the execution of ECtHR judgments and of friendly settlements.99 In order
to allow the EU to partake in the Committee of Ministers for the purposes of
the Convention, Article 7 of the accession agreement provides that the EU shall
have a vote in these matters. The drafters realized that there might be a problem
with block voting in cases where the supervision of a judgment against the EU,
either alone or together with a Member State, is on the agenda. The background
is that after accession the EU and its Member States will command twenty-eight
out of forty-eight votes in the Council of Ministers allowing it to block every
96 The accession agreement explicitly stipulates that the procedure before the ECJ cannot be
considered ‘another procedure of international investigation or settlement’ under Art 35(2)(b)
ECHR, cf Art 5 of the draft.
97 Sert v Turkey, no 17598/90, 1 April 1992.
98 A similar argument is made in an earlier draft of the explanatory report, CDDH-UE(2011)05,
para 66.
99 Articles 46(2) and 39(4) ECHR.
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decision. Coupled with the duty of loyalty, which may force the EU Member
States to vote in concert with the EU in order to comply with the requirement of
unity in the international representation of the Union,100 there would be a
serious problem in the supervision of the execution of judgments by the EU.
After all, it is unlikely that the EU would agree with a finding that it has failed to
implement a judgment against it by the Strasbourg Court. Thus the agreement
provides that the rules of the Committee of Ministers should be amended for
this eventuality. The explanatory report reveals that in cases where a block vote
by the EU is likely, a decision by the Council of Ministers should be adopted
without a formal vote.101 This would mean that the voting rules would not be
applied so that a majority of the non-EU Member States would suffice. This
provision in the draft agreement has been the subject of much criticism notably
by the United Kingdom and France since it might set a precedent with regard to
other international for a in which the EU and its Member States participate
jointly.102 Other Member States do not share this view and fear that otherwise
the impartiality of the Committee of Ministers might be compromised. This
suggests that with regard to the EU’s participation in the Committee of
Ministers the last word has not yet been spoken. In the eyes of this author
the solution contained in the draft agreement seems workable and does not
clearly undermine the EU’s position as regards other agreements.
Less controversial would be the EU’s participation in the Council of
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly, a body which is inter alia in charge of
electing the judges at the ECtHR. As the EU will have its own judge in
Strasbourg, it was necessary to provide for the involvement of a delegation of
the European Parliament in the Parliamentary Assembly. Article 6 of the acces-
sion agreement provides that the European Parliament is to have as many dele-
gates as the largest national delegation.103 Further details will be subject to an
agreement between the European Parliament and the Parliamentary
Assembly.104
100 Opinion 1/94, WTO Agreements [1994] ECR I-5267, para 108.
101 CDDH-UE(2011)16fin, para 76; this would especially affect Rule 11 of the current rules, which
provides that a 2/3 majority is needed in order to refer the question of whether a party has failed to
fulfil its obligations back to the Court, cf Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of
the execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements, adopted by the Committee of
Ministers at its 964th meeting, 10 May 2006.
102 Council of the EU doc no 16385/11, pp 5–6.
103 Currently Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Russia each have eighteen delegates.
104 cf Art 6(2) accession agreement and statement by co-chairs of PACE-European Parliament joint
informal body <http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/APFeaturesManager/defaultArtSiteView.asp?ID
=991> accessed 13 December 2011.
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II. The effects of accession on the EU’s legal order
Having dwelt on the consequences of EU accession for the ECHR, the impli-
cations for the EU’s legal order remain to be explored. The article addresses
whether accession leads to a reviewability of CFSP measures through the back
door, the consequences of the ECHR becoming an ‘integral part’ of EU law and
whether decisions by the ECtHR will be binding on the ECJ.
A. Review of CFSP Measures?
As mentioned above, accession by the EU to the ECHR will close a gap in the
ECtHR’s jurisdiction to review EU actions and omissions. The question is
whether the ECtHR’s new jurisdiction would also cover EU actions and omis-
sions adopted under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). As
Jacque´ pointed out, such jurisdiction might result in an asymmetry between
the control exercised by the ECJ and by the ECtHR.105 As is well known,
Article 275 TFEU has largely excluded the ECJ’s jurisdiction over the provisions
of the CFSP and acts adopted on their basis, the only exceptions being claims by
individuals regarding restrictive measures and cases concerning Article 40 TEU.
Given that restrictive measures are the most likely measures under the CFSP to
fall foul of human rights requirements, one may ask whether there might be any
cases in practice where this asymmetry in jurisdiction might materialize. After
all, most action under the CFSP is of a political rather than a legal nature.
However, the newly codified Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is
an exception. Article 42(1) TEU provides for missions outside the Union, which
according to Article 43(1) TEU includes inter alia peace-keeping, conflict pre-
vention, and post-conflict stabilisation. Such tasks are carried out by the civilian
and military authorities of the Member States, on which the Union may draw.
Thus similar situations as in the case of Behrami and Saramati may occur.106
The factual scenarios underlying this decision can be used to illustrate the issues
potentially facing the ECtHR as regards the CFSP.
In Behrami and Saramati the applicants argued that the respondent States
were responsible for actions and omissions of their troops which formed part of
the security presence in Kosovo (KFOR). The ECtHR held that the parties to
the Convention could not be held responsible for these troops as they were
under the command of the United Nations so that their action did not occur
within the jurisdiction of the respondent States as required by Article 1 ECHR.
105 Jacque´, n 5, 1005.
106 Behrami v France and Saramati v France, Germany and Norway [GC], nos 71412/01 and
78166/01, 2 May 2007.
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The same result as regards the Member States might be reached if an operation
were carried out under the auspices of the EU.107
Regarding the EU’s responsibility in such cases, it may prove problematic that
the types of missions described above are usually carried out outside the territory
of the European Union. The recent Al-Skeini decision re-emphasized that jur-
isdiction is mainly a territorial concept and that a High Contracting Party can
only be held responsible for extra-territorial action in exceptional cases.108 Yet
two of the exceptions mentioned in Al-Skeini might be relevant to EU missions:
first, situations where the host State has acquiesced to the EU exercising some of
its public powers109 and second, a situation in which the EU exercises effective
control of an area.110
Against this background, the question for the EU would be whether it should
exclude the ECtHR’s jurisdiction over such action by making a reservation to
the ECHR to this effect or excluding the applicability of the ECHR to actions
and omissions under Title V of the TEU, which deals with the CFSP.111 A
blanket exclusion of the CFSP would potentially lead to an exclusion of juris-
diction over restrictive measures adopted under it.112 Since measures of this
kind are particularly controversial from a human rights perspective,113 excluding
the ECtHR’s review in these cases would send a problematic signal to other
Convention parties and might even induce them to reject the accession agree-
ment. One could conceive of a more limited exclusion of the ECtHR’s juris-
diction by restricting it to cases over which the ECJ has jurisdiction. This would
have the advantage of avoiding the asymmetry in jurisdiction mentioned above.
However such an exclusion might end up being vague and would force the
ECtHR to decide whether the ECJ would have had jurisdiction over a given case
or not.
Moreover, apart from these legal difficulties, a blanket exclusion of the CFSP
would not be desirable. The main reason for the inclusion of Article 275 TFEU
107 cf Articles 42 TEU et seq on the Common Security and Defence Policy; but it is important to
remember that the exact distribution of responsibility in cases of EU missions under the CSDP
would very much depend on the particular command structure in place for each mission. This
became evident in the recent Al-Jedda case in which the ECtHR distinguished Behrami and
Saramati since in contrast to Kosovo, the UN had not assumed control over the implementation
of the Security Council Resolutions rendered with regard to Iraq (Al-Jedda v United Kingdom [GC]
no 27021/08, 7 July 2011, para 83). Thus the violations were fully attributable to the United
Kingdom as the State whose troops had committed them
108 Al-Skeini and others v United Kingdom, no 55721/07, 7 July 2011, para 131.
109 Ibid at para 135.
110 Ibid at para 138.
111 This has been suggested by the French government, but many other Member States thought such
an exclusion to be unacceptable, cf Council of the EU doc no 16385/11, p 3.
112 Depending on the exact formulation of an exclusion, there would be potential for some debate
over the exact limits of an exclusion since the restrictive measures as such would be adopted on the
basis of Art 215 TFEU, which might render them reviewable.
113 A good example is the scenario in the Kadi case, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05
P [2008] ECR I-6351.
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was to preserve the intergovernmental and political character of the CFSP and
thereby the sovereignty of the Member States. This objective would not be in
danger if the ECtHR were to exercise jurisdiction over violations of human
rights committed under the CFSP. There is no danger of the ECtHR interfering
with issues touching on the sovereignty of the Member States. Rather, such
jurisdiction would remove a peculiar gap in the accountability for human
rights violations existent at the moment where troops operating under the com-
mand of an international organization can escape scrutiny by the ECtHR
whereas troops operating under the command of a State party to the ECHR
cannot.114 Furthermore, this would not be the only case where an asymmetry in
jurisdiction would exist after accession. After all, the ECtHR will be given
jurisdiction to measure primary EU law by ECHR standards. In such cases,
the ECJ cannot review the compatibility of primary legislation with fundamen-
tal rights either.
B. The ECHR as an Integral Part of EU Law
The question of the ECHR’s status in the EU’s legal order may be less obvious
but is worth exploring. The main issue is whether the ECHR will be directly
applicable in EU law and, if so, whether this would be of practical relevance
given the protection already offered by the EU’s fundamental rights laid down
in the Charter of Fundamental Rights and recognised as general principles of
EU law.
Under the so-called Haegeman doctrine, international agreements concluded
by the EU, such as the ECHR, become ‘an integral part of EU law’.115 But it
does not automatically follow that they are directly applicable, ie invocable
before the courts. For such effect, the ECJ’s case-law demands that two further
conditions are met. First, the wording, purpose, and nature116 of the agreement
must not exclude direct effect.117 Second, the provision in question must be
clear, precise, and unconditional.118 The ECHR would satisfy this test. It is
designed to protect individual rights, which in the words of the ECtHR are not
‘theoretical and illusory but practical and effective’. This implies that an indi-
vidual must be able to rely on them in court. Furthermore, the human rights
contained in the ECHR are clear and precise, especially when read in light of the
vast case-law by the ECtHR, and need no further implementation. Thus the
114 cf Behrami and Saramati, n 106.
115 Case 181/73, Haegeman v Belgian State [1974] ECR 449.
116 Another formulation found in the ECJ’s case-law is ‘the spirit, the general scheme and the terms’,
cf Joined Cases 21/72–24/72, International Fruit Company [1972] ECR 1219.
117 Case 12/86, Demirel v Stadt Schwa¨bisch Gmu¨nd [1987] 3719, para 14; such exclusion was for
instance found regarding the WTO agreements, cf Case C-149/96, Portugal v Council [1999] ECR
I-8395 and with regard to the United Nation Convention on the Law of the Sea, cf Case C-308/06,
Intertanko [2008] ECR I-4057.
118 Demirel, ibid.
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ECHR must be considered directly applicable after accession. This will mean a
change to the current legal situation under Article 6(3) TEU, which does not
affect the relationship between the ECHR and national law.119 Yet, as will be
shown below, accession to the ECHR will not enhance the internal protection of
fundamental rights beyond the guarantees already provided by the EU Charter
of Fundamental Rights.
There are no further difficulties where actions and omissions by the EU’s
institutions are at issue before the European Court of Justice: the ECJ must
apply the Convention. However, where Member State action is concerned the
answer is far less clear. The difficulty stems from the janiform character of
national authorities: they act (1) as authorities of the Member States stricto
sensu, ie when implementing Member State legislation drawn up in the exercise
of the Member State’s own sovereignty and (2) as authorities implementing EU
law. The problem is, therefore, how to determine under which circumstances the
ECHR is applicable as part of EU law and under which circumstances it is
applicable according to the constitutional rules of the Member State. This dis-
tinction is important because within the legal orders of the Member States, the
status of EU law usually differs from the status of ordinary international law
such as the ECHR. The United Kingdom is a case in point. Section 2 of the
European Communities Act 1972 as interpreted by the House of Lords in
Factortame120 establishes that European Union law takes primacy over domestic
law.121 In cases of conflict, the UK’s courts are thus under obligation to disapply
domestic law in so far as it contradicts EU law. In contrast, where a piece of UK
legislation is found to contradict the ECHR, the courts are under obligation to
interpret that legislation in accordance with the ECHR122 and where this is not
possible, they can make a declaration of incompatibility.123 In the latter case
they are nonetheless bound to apply the legislation. If the ECHR were to be
applied as part of EU law, however, by virtue of the Haegman doctrine it would
have to be accorded the same effect as EU law and would thus take primacy over
domestic legislation in case of a conflict.
Regarding the ECHR, the root of the complication lies in the membership of
both the EU and its Member States to it. According to Article 216(2) TFEU,
the Union’s agreements are also binding on the Member States. It should be
noted that Article 216(2) TFEU only has internal effect and does not alter the
responsibility on the international plane. This means that internally the Member
States are obliged to comply with the entirety of an agreement which was
concluded by the EU alone. Where so-called mixed agreements are concerned,
119 Case C-571/10, Kamberaj [2012] ECR I-00000, para 62.
120 Factortame Ltd v Secretary of State for Transport (No 2) [1991] AC 603.
121 For a detailed discussion cf P Craig, Britain in the European Union, in J Jowell and D Oliver
(eds), The Changing Constitution, 6th edn (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2007), 84, 91 et seq.
122 Section 3 Human Rights Act 1998.
123 Section 4 Human Rights Act 1998.
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ie agreements concluded by both the EU and its Member States, only the EU
part of the agreements is binding on the Member States qua EU law. The
remaining part is binding on them qua international law. Since the ECHR
will be concluded by the EU alone, it will not be a typical ‘mixed agreement’.
Nonetheless after accession both the EU and all Member States will be parties to
it so that it should be considered a mixed agreement and the question arises in
how far the Member States are bound by it as part of EU law. In order to answer
this question it is necessary to briefly analyse the rationale behind mixed agree-
ments and their potential for direct effect.
Mixed agreements are usually concluded because neither the EU nor the
Member States have the external competence to conclude the agreement
alone.124 Only those parts of a mixed agreement for which the EU had com-
petence are capable of having direct effect under EU law. For the other part the
internal effect can only be determined by the Member State’s constitutional
law.125 But the situation regarding the ECHR is different. The reason why both
the EU and Member States will eventually be parties to the ECHR is not that
neither of them would be able to sign up to it independently. Thus the question
under which circumstances the ECHR is directly applicable in the legal orders
of the Member States qua EU law, cannot be answered in the same manner. It is
necessary to take a different approach in order to determine its direct effect.
To reach a solution, one needs to ask what the rationale for the direct effect of
EU agreements is. While the exact conditions for direct effect of international
agreements and the ECJ’s case-law in this respect have attracted a lot of scholarly
attention,126 not much has been said about why provisions of such agreements
should have such effect, if they fulfil the conditions described above. In the past,
the Court largely transposed the internal approach to direct effect to interna-
tional agreements.127 The main rationale given by the Court for the direct effect
of the EU’s Treaties in van Gend128 is the effectiveness of EU law. By pointing to
the Court’s jurisdiction to interpret the Treaties given to it under Article 267
TFEU, its argument assumed that the involvement of private parties in the
124 M Maresceau, ‘A Typology of Mixed Bilateral Agreements’ in P Koutrakos (ed), Mixed
Agreements Revisited (Hart: Oxford, 2010), 11, 14; for instance the WTO agreements had to be
concluded as mixed agreements as (before Lisbon) the EU did not have the external competence over
all aspects of services and trade mark law, cf Opinion 1/94, n 100.
125 cf the recent decision in Case C-240/09, Lesoochrana´rske zoskupenie VLK v Ministerstvo zˇivotne´ho
prostredia Slovenskej republiky [2011] ECR I-00000, para 32.
126 Just to name a few: P Eeckhout, External Relations of the European Union, 2nd edn (Oxford
University Press: Oxford, 2011), 323; P Koutrakos, EU International Relations Law (Hart: Oxford,
2006), 217; F Jacobs, ‘Direct Effect and Interpretation of International Agreements in the Recent
Case Law of the European Court of Justice’ in A Dashwood and M Maresceau (eds), Law and Practice
of EU External Relations (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge 2008), 13; C Kaddous, ‘Effects of
International Agreements in the EU Legal Order’ in M Cremona and B de Witte (eds), EU Foreign
Relations Law (Hart: Oxford, 2008), 291; M Mendez, ‘The Legal Effect of Community Agreements:
Maximalist Treaty Enforcement and Judicial Avoidance Techniques’ (2010) 21 EJIL 83.
127 Eeckhout, n 126, 381.
128 Case 26/62, van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1.
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enforcement of European Union law would enhance its effectiveness.
Enforcement, private or public, of European Union law can only occur where
European Union law is applicable. This can only be the case where the Member
State has acted within the scope of EU law. There is thus a clear parallel to the
responsibility of the Member States under Article 51(1) of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights.129 Applied to the ECHR, this would include cases of
Member State action on the basis of a provision of EU law and the compatibility
of implementing legislation with the Convention.
A further question then is whether the Member States would also be respon-
sible under the Convention for derogating from EU law.130 An answer would
certainly depend on whether a fundamental right under the Convention is
interfered with in such cases. A look at the classic examples from the ECJ’s
case-law reveals that this is hardly conceivable. For instance in Schmidberger the
situation was such that Schmidberger’s right to free movement of goods was
restricted in order to allow a demonstration to take place. Thus none of
Schmidberger’s Convention rights had been at issue. In a similar vein, in
Omega the claimant’s freedom to provide services was affected but not its
rights under the Convention. Thus derogation cases will probably be of no
relevance in this respect.
The discussion has so far established that the Member States would be bound
by the ECHR as part of EU law where their authorities implement obligations
under EU law. The question is how this outcome can be squared with Article
6(2) TEU, which postulates that ‘[. . .] accession shall not affect the Union’s
competences [. . .]’. Coupled with Article 2 of Protocol No 8 to the Treaty of
Lisbon, which provides that the accession agreement ‘shall ensure that nothing
therein affects the situation of the Member States in relation to the European
Convention’, this provision shows that accession must not lead to an increase in
the competences of the Union. Conscious of these limitations contained in the
Treaties, the drafters of the accession agreement provided in Article 1(2)(c) that
‘nothing in this agreement shall require the European Union to perform an act
or adopt a measure for which it has no competence under European Union law.’
It is submitted that the result just reached does not contradict this objective. The
Union’s own fundamental rights already reach this far. The only true limit
which Article 6(2) TEU and the Protocol might impose upon the drafters of
the accession Treaty relates to the Protocols to which the Union may sign up.
The draft agreement foresees that the EU accedes to the Convention and the
first and sixth Protocol. Since all Member States are already parties to these two
Protocols, accession will not substantially affect them. Furthermore, all rights
guaranteed in these two Protocols are already existent in EU law today.
129 On the debate surrounding the interpretation of that provision cf P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty
(Oxford University Press; Oxford, 2010), 193; the informal working group on accession seemed to
assume the same, cf CDDH-UE(2010)03, para 9.
130 This question is not yet settled as regards Art 51(1) Charter, cf Craig, ibid at 211 et seq.
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Yet the parallelism to Article 51(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights
raises the question whether the potential direct effect of the ECHR has any
practical relevance given that the Charter provides more extensive protection
and ranks higher than the ECHR in the hierarchy of the sources of EU law. All
rights contained in the Convention are equally guaranteed in the Charter.
Moreover, Article 52(3) of the Charter provides that the Convention rights
which correspond to the rights in the Charter should have the same meaning
and scope unless EU law provides for more extensive protection. This in
effect makes the ECHR the minimum standard for human rights protection
in the EU.
However, there is the UK and Polish Protocol to the Lisbon Treaty,131 which
by some has been hailed as an opt-out of the Charter by these two Member
States. The view that the Protocol has led to the United Kingdom and Poland
not being bound by the Charter seems to have been adopted by a judge in the
High Court of England and Wales, who stated that ‘[g]iven the [. . .] Protocol,
the Charter cannot be relied on as against the United Kingdom [. . .]’.132 The
Court of Appeal made a preliminary reference in the case to the Court of Justice
inter alia asking about the relevance of the UK/Polish Protocol.133 It is inter-
esting to note that the UK government’s representative before the Court of
Appeal argued that the High Court Judge erred in its assessment, stating that
‘the purpose of the Protocol is not to prevent the Charter from applying to the
United Kingdom, but to explain its effect’.134 In her Opinion, Advocate
General Trstenjak agreed with most commentators that Article 1(1) of that
Protocol does not have any effect on the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction to
find UK law to be inconsistent with the rights contained in the Charter since
the wording of that Article is limited in that it only provides that the jurisdiction
of the ECJ is not extended.135 This view was also taken by the ECJ.136 In view
of the ECJ’s finding, the ECHR will thus not have any practically relevant
internal effect in the Member States.
Thus the ECHR’s status post-accession as an integral part of European Union
law will have no practical consequences for the human rights protection in the
Member States. Where a Member State acts within the scope of EU law, it is
already bound by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, which goes further than
131 Protocol No 30 to the Treaty of Lisbon [2010] OJ C 83/313.
132 R (on the application of Saeedi) v Secreatary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWHC 705
(Admin), para 155 (per Cranston J).
133 Case C-411/10, NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] ECR I-00000.
134 Quoted in NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 990.
135 Case C-411/10, NS v Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2011] ECR I-00000, Opinion
of AG Tstenjak, 22 September 2011, para 165 et seq; P Craig, The Lisbon Treaty (Oxford University
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the ECHR. Where the Member State acts outside the scope of EU law, the
ECHR will apply to it in the same manner as today, ie in accordance with its
own domestic law.
C. Binding decisions by ECtHR?
While the ECHR’s effects as an integral part of EU law will hardly be of
practical relevance, the same cannot be said for the effect of the ECtHR’s de-
cisions in cases brought against the EU. After accession the ECJ could be
tempted to apply its famous dictum from Opinion 1/91:
Where, however, an international agreement provides for its own system of courts,
including a court with jurisdiction to settle disputes between the Contracting Parties to
the agreement, and, as a result to interpret its provisions, the decisions of that court
will be binding on the Community institutions, including the Court of Justice. Those
decisions will also be binding in the event that the Court of Justice is called upon to
rule, by way of preliminary ruling or in a direct action, on the interpretation of the
international agreement, in so far as that agreement is an integral part of the
Community legal order.137
The ECHR is an international agreement with its own court, so that the dictum
appears to be applicable.138 This is underscored by the rationale behind the
binding effect such decisions have on the institutions of the EU. If an agreement
provides that the parties to it must follow the decisions of the Court established
to interpret the agreement, the EU and its institutions (including the ECJ),
must be deemed to be bound by these decisions. But it is not clear from
Opinion 1/91 how far that binding effect would go. It is unlikely that the
ECJ envisaged a bindingness akin to a doctrine of stare decisis since such a
doctrine does not exist anywhere in EU law or international law. Moreover,
under international law only the decisions rendered in proceedings to which the
EU was a party, are binding on it. Considering that the rationale behind the
dictum in Opinion 1/91 can be found in international law, the ECJ can only be
bound a decision where the EU was a party to the case. Furthermore, Article 46
ECHR shows that the decisions of the ECtHR are only binding inter partes.
Therefore, under the ECHR, the ECJ can only be bound by those decisions to
which the EU was a party. It is suggested that the ECJ did not intend the
bindingness of such decisions to go further than is required by international
law standards. It follows that where the ECtHR finds that the EU has violated
the rights guaranteed in the ECHR, the ECJ will be bound by that decision
when interpreting provisions of the ECHR in a subsequent case dealing with the
same issue. Such a situation might, for example, arise where the applicant has
137 Opinion 1/91 [1991] ECR I-6079, para 39.
138 This seems to be doubted by A Rosas, ‘The European Court of Justice in Context: Forms and
Patterns of Judicial Dialogue’, 2 EJIL <http://www.ejls.eu> accessed 13 December 2011.
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suffered a damage due to the EU’s human rights violation and then holds the
EU responsible under Article 340(2) TFEU.139 In such a case, the ECJ would be
required to decide whether there has been a violation of the ECHR. Where the
applicant has already obtained a decision in her favour, the ECJ would be bound
to follow that judgment.
Conclusions
This contribution has tried to show that EU accession to the ECHR raises
complex questions. The drafters of the accession agreement largely managed
to live up to their original ambition which was to preserve the ECHR system
and only make the adaptations which are necessary.140 Yet this ambition has led
to an unsatisfactory solution as regards the co-respondent mechanism. While the
voluntariness of the mechanism may be a matter for debate, the treatment of
omissions is unresolved and contains the potential for conflict. Procedurally, the
co-respondent mechanism and the prior involvement of the ECJ annexed to it
will prolong proceedings and make them more complex. In contrast, the prac-
tical effects of accession are only limited in view of an already strong catalogue of
human rights existent at EU level and of the responsibility of the Member States
in the ECtHR for most EU action. The main improvement is therefore to be
seen in the ECtHR’s new jurisdiction over cases such as Connolly. A further
improvement, which should perhaps not be underestimated, is the growing
awareness within the EU’s institutions that an external review will be possible.
Recent changes to the EU’s internal human rights monitoring such as the pro-
vision for a human rights watchdog for the EU’s border agency FRONTEX can
be seen in this light.141
But whether the accession agreement as it currently stands will be the (happy)
end to a story of epic proportions remains to be seen. It is likely that further
chapters to the accession saga will be added. The EU is currently in the process
of adopting the internal rules governing its membership of the ECHR, in par-
ticular the rules relating to the prior involvement of the ECJ. Once these have
been agreed, it is likely that the ECJ will be asked for an Opinion under Article
218(11) TFEU on whether the agreement and the internal rules are compatible
with the exigencies of the EU Treaties. Even if the ECJ gives the agreement a
green light, it is likely that the agreement will come under two further types of
139 Regarding the decisions of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body the ECJ has been unwilling
recognize them as binding, mainly due to the peculiarities of WTO law: Case C-377/02, Van Parys v
BIRB [2005] ECR I-1465; Confirmed in Case 351/04, Ikea Wholesale Ltd v Commissioner of Customs
& Excise [2007] ECR I-7723.
140 CDDH-UE 2010(01) para 5.
141 vcf European Parliament, Press Release of 13 December 2011<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
en/pressroom/content/20110913IPR26455/html/FRONTEX-new-human-rights-watchdog-new-
powers> accessed 13 December 2011.
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pressure: first, as the recent discussions in the Council of Ministers, to which this
paper has referred, have shown, the parties concerned may not be happy with
the content of the agreement and demand amendments. This may cause further
delay in achieving accession. Second, there may be reasons extraneous to the
actual agreement which might lead parties to the Convention to block accession.
In this context one should remember the difficult birth of Protocol 14 which for
a long time was blocked by Russia for political reasons.
It would therefore be overly optimistic to regard the draft agreement as the
final word of the epic of the EU’s accession to the ECHR. But it marks the
beginning not only of its final chapter but also beckons an entirely new story on
the EU’s membership of the ECHR.
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